Abstract. Security properties such as privacy, authentication, and integrity are of increasing importance to networked systems( KAU]). Systems with security requirements typically must operate with a high degree of condence. We show how the message structures of Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM, LIN, BAL]) and the functionson PEM structures have the desired implementation-independent security properties. Higher-order logic ( AND]) and the HOL theorem-prover( GOR]) are used to precisely relate security properties to system speci cations. The structures of MIC-CLEAR and ENCRYPTED messages are modeled as tuples of elds. Each of these elds is modeled as a type which takes only a limited set of values as valid ( MEL]). Security functions for checking privacy, integrity, source authenticationand non-repudiation of received messages are de ned in HOL. They take as parameters a subset of elds de ned above. It is proved that mail messages have these security properties if-and-only-if mail messages satisfy the security functions.
Introduction
The increasing use of local and wide area networks has increased interest in secure communication where the underlying network itself is insecure. Techniques using encryption, source authentication, message hashing, and digital signatures are used to provide secure communications over insecure networks.
When building secure networked communications systems a fundamental question is, \how will we precisely understand the security requirements and by what means will we assure that our designs satisfy the requirements?"
The engineering view we adopt is to use techniques which answer: 1) What objects are in our design? 2) What are the operations on the objects? and 3) How is it known if the objects have the desired properties? For secure electronic mail, the objects of interest are electronic mail messages. Messages have de ned structures. Security functions and services are determined by the particular message type or structure. De ning message structures as types aids in proving that implementation-speci c functions and services satisfy system-wide security requirements which are implementation independent.
To illustrate this, we focus on Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) LIN] as an example. The techniques we use on PEM are applicable to other message formats and systems, e.g. the National Security Agency's MISSI (Multilevel Information System Security Initiative) system, NSA].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. An overview of PEM is given in Section 2. Section 3 illustrates how security functions are described in the Higher Order Logic theorem prover, HOL, GOR] . Section 4 brie y describes how message structure is de ned in HOL. Section 5 describes message-speci c security functions and correctness properties in HOL. We conclude in Section 6. privacy { the ability to keep anyone but the intended recipient from reading the message; 2) authentication { reassurance to the recipient of the identity of the sender; 3) integrity { reassurance to the recipient that the message has not been altered since it was transmitted by the sender; and 4) non-repudiation { reassurance to the recipient that he can prove to a third party that the originator did send the message.
2.2. PEM Message Structure. There are ve types of PEM messages: 1) ENCRYPTED, 2) MIC-CLEAR, 3) MIC-ONLY, 4) CRL, and 5) CRL-RETRIEV-AL-REQUEST. ENCRYPTED, MIC-CLEAR, and MIC-ONLY messages have secret key and public key variants. In this paper, only the public key variant is considered. By examining each eld in a message, we obtain 1) the message text itself which may or may not be encoded or encrypted, and 2) the necessary information to determine its security properties, i.e. authenticity, integrity, non-repudiation and means of encryption. Message structure and contents imply the message type and security services that must be applied.
2.3. Security Functions. Privacy is achieved by encryption. Authentication is achieved using secrets. Integrity is obtained by digital signatures, which are the signed message digests. Non-repudiation is checked by signed message.
2.3.1. Encryption. There are two types of encryption: secret or symmetric key cryptography and public or asymmetric key cryptography. Symmetric key cryptography uses the same key for both encryption and decryption. In public or asymmetric key cryptography, di erent keys are used for encryption and decryption.
2.3.2. Authentication. Encryption is used for authenticating or verifying identities. The idea behind authentication is for the person or system to prove it has knowledge of a private key to validate its identity.
For the authentication procedures to work, cryptographic information for users must be available and certi ed by some authority. Authentication in PEM is done using certi cates. Certi cates are data structures which contain the public information of users. Hashes are used for integrity checking. A signed hash of a message is sent with the message as the message integrity code (MIC). The recipient checks the integrity of the received message by computing the hash or message digest of the received message and verifying the received signed message digest against the computed hash.
Security Functions and Properties in HOL
A person is identi ed by his/her keys. In public key cryptography, the person is identi ed by a public key which is known to everyone. Since a private key belongs to only one owner, the corresponding public key uniquely identi es that person. In secret key cryptography, two or more people who share a secret key are identi ed by that secret; a key uniquely identi es the group that shares it.
3.1. Retrieval. In PEM ENCRYPTED messages, two types of encryption keys are used. 1) Data Encryption Keys (DEKs) are used for encrypting message text and for message integrity codes (MICs). DEKs are randomly generated by a sender and sent to a receiver as a part of the PEM message. 2) Interchange Keys (IKs) are used to encrypt DEKs for transmission within messages. IKs are a receiver's public keys.
To retrieve a plaintext message, the recipient retrieves the DEK rst using his/her private key, then retrieves the plaintext message using DEK. The following theorem shows that the DEK is retrievable when 1) DEK is encrypted using the intended recipient's public key, and the encrypted DEK is decrypted using the recipient's private key; 2) decryptP is the inverse of encryptP; 3) the received ciphertext is the transmitted ciphertext; and 4) the recipient of the message is the intended recipient. A similar theorem for message retrieval is also shown.
Theorem 3.1. DEK retrievablè 8encryptP decryptP MESSAGE0 txmsg ekeyIR dkeyIR rxmessage rxmsg dkeyR:
(txmsg = encryptP MESSAGE0 ekeyIR) (rxmessage = decryptP rxmsg dkeyR) (8m: decryptP (encryptP m ekeyIR) dkeyIR = m) (rxmsg = txmsg) (dkeyR = dkeyIR) (rxmessage = MESSAGE0) 3.2. Privacy. The following theorem shows that the original plaintext message is con dential, when 1) the message is properly encrypted using DEK; 2) anything encrypted by a secret key can only be retrieved by the same key; and 3) communication channels are ideal. The con dentiality of DEK can be shown in a similar way. is Intact is true if-and-only-if the received message is identical to the one transmitted. The correctness theorem is proved using the de nition of is Intact with the following assumptions: 1) Hash function is one-to-one; 2) MIC eld is the signed message digest; 3) Signature of a speci c message can be veri ed through the signer's public key.
Theorem 3.5. is Intact msg Correct 8verify sign hash txmessage rxmessage txmic rxmic ekey dkey:
(txmic = sign (hash txmessage) dkey) (rxmic = txmic) (8m1 m2: (hash m1 = hash m2) (m1 = m2)) (8s1 s2: verify s1 (sign s2 dkey) ekey = s1 = s2) ((rxmessage = txmessage) = is Intact verify hash rxmessage rxmic ekey)
When the received MIC is not the same as the one sent by the originator, the following theorem proves that the recipient cannot be sure of the integrity of either the MIC or plaintext message. (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dKEY 0) (8m1 m2: verify m1 m2 ekey = (m2 = sign m1 dKEY 0)) (8m1 m2 dkey1 dkey2: (sign m1 dkey1 = sign m2 dkey2) (m1 = m2)^(dkey1 = dkey2))
:(rxmic = txmic) :(is Intact verify hash MESSAGE0 rxmic ekey) 3.4. Source Authentication. The function is Authentic checks the source authenticity of a received message. If veri cation of the retrieved signature against the retrieved message succeeds, the recipient can be sure of the source of the received message. See Table 1 for parameters used in the de nition.
Definition 3.7. is Authentic def 8verify hash message mic ekey:
is Authentic verify hash message mic ekey = verify (hash message) mic ekey
The source authentication check is Authentic is true if and only if the originator of the message is the one identi ed by the public key we use to verify the signature. The correctness of the check can be proved if: 1) Hash function is one-to-one; 2) MIC eld is the signed message hash; and 3) It is computationally infeasible to nd two messages and two private keys which can generate same signature. Theorem 3.8. is Authentic msg correct. 8verify sign hash message MESSAGE0 txmic rxmic ekey dKEY 0 dkey:
(rxmic = txmic) (txmic = sign(hashMESSAGE0)dkey) (8m1 m2: (hash m1 = hash m2) = m1 = m2) (8m1 m2 dkey2: verify m1(sign m2 dkey2)ekey = (m1 = m2)^(dkey2 = dKEY 0)) ((dkey = dKEY 0)^(message = MESSAGE0) = is Authentic verify hash message rxmic ekey)
If the rst assumption is not satis ed, the source authentication fails and the recipient of the message cannot be sure of the source of the message. The correctness of this statement can be shown in a similar theorem to not Intact.
If hash function is not one-to-one, we can de ne an equivalence relation ( hash) on the message space: 8m1 m2: ( hash) m1 m2 = (hash m1 = hash m2) Function is Authentic will either succeed or fail for all the messages in an equivalence class induced by ( hash). Instead of identifying the source of a single message MESSAGE0 as dKEY 0, is Authentic will take dKEY 0 as the originator for every message in equivalence class
This is the problem raised in MIT]. 3.5. Non-Repudiation. Function is non Deniable is the security check of non-repudiation property of the message system. It checks the non-deniability of the sender of the message by verifying the signature against the received plaintext. See Table 1 for parameters used in the de nition. Definition 3.9. is non Deniablè def 8verify message signature ekey:
is non Deniable verify message signature ekey = verify message signature ekey
The non-repudiation check de ned above is true if and only if the received message is generated by the originator whose public key is ekey, and the originator cannot deny having sent the message. This claim is true under these assumptions: 1) Hash function is one-to-one; 2) MIC eld is the signed message digest; 3) It is computationally infeasible to nd two message and two private keys which can generate same signature. Its corresponding correctness theorem is proved using the de nition of is non Deniable.
Theorem 3.10. is non Deniable msg 8verify sign hash message MESSAGE0 txmic rxmic ekey dKEY 0 dkey:
(rxmic = txmic) (txmic = sign(hashMESSAGE0)dkey) (8m1 m2: (hash m1 = hash m2) = m1 = m2) (8m1 m2 dkey2: verify m1(sign m2 dkey2)ekey = (m1 = m2)^(dkey2 = dKEY 0)) ((dkey = dKEY 0)^(message = MESSAGE0) = is non Deniable verify (hash message) rxmic ekey)
When the received MIC is not the same as the transmitted MIC, the recipient cannot show to a third party that the originator has indeed sent the message. The correctness of this statement can be shown in a similar theorem to not Intact.
In this paper, all assumptions for correctness theorem are antecedents of nested implications. There are no assumed axioms.
The de nitions and properties developed in this section are independent of any particular implementation. What we must do is to link the particular implementation to the general de nitions and properties. For this we must de ne the structure of PEM messages. A valid representation function is any function which is an isomorphism. Objects having a property P are denoted by Hilbert's "-operator, MEL]. The semantics of " are given below.`8 P: (9x: P x) P("x: P x)
When de ning a new type from an existing one, P identi es the subset of the existing type used to represent the new type. TY PE DEF de nes the properties of a valid representation.
def TY PE DEF P rep = (8a1 a2: rep a1 = rep a2 a1 = a2)( 8r: P r = 9a: r = rep a) REP = " rep: TY PE DEF P rep is any valid representation, ABS r = " a: (r = REP a) de nes a valid abstraction function based on REP.
4.2. MIC info as a Type. We focus on the MIC info portion of a message.
MIC info is modeled as a 3-tuple where the rst element identi es the hash function used to compute the MIC; the second element is the signature algorithm used to encrypt the MIC; and the third element is the signed message digest for the transmitted message.
Valid MIC Info elds are a proper subset of all 3-tuples of (algid algid asymsignmic). The predicate is MIC info identi es the valid 3-tuples for MICInfo. The representation function REP MIC info and the abstraction function MIC info are de ned following the type de nition procedure in HOL. Now various accessor functions can be de ned to get the hash algorithm, signature algorithm, and signed message digest portions of the MIC Info eld.
As the algorithm names in the MIC info eld are just names and not the actual hash and signature functions, we de ne signature and hash selector functions which take a function name and return its corresponding function.
Security Functions for PEM Messages
With the de nition of selector and accessor functions de ned above, we can de ne security functions for speci c PEM message format. As an example, we will show the integrity checking function for MIC-CLEAR messages and the source authentication checking function for ENCRYPTED messages. The integrity checking function MIC CLEAR is Intact for MIC-CLEAR messages is de ned as the general integrity function is Intact, with its parameters specialized with the hash and signature selection functions.
Definition 5. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey2) ekey = (m1 = m2)^dkey2 = dKEY 0) ((dkey = dKEY 0)^(message = MESSAGE0) = ENCRY PTED is Authentic Encrypted msg)
Conclusions
This work focuses on verifying the security properties of Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM). Security properties such as privacy, source authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation are de ned independently of any implementation structure. PEM message structures and operations on those structures are shown to have the desired security properties. Various PEM structures are de ned as types. Security interpretations are de ned as operations on these types.
Properties of cryptographic algorithms are modeled and used as antecedents of a nested implication. Without guarantee of these properties, the security checks de ned in the paper would not add much assurance to the design.
All the de nitions and proofs are done using the Higher Order Logic (HOL) theorem-prover. While at times the proofs are intricate, the proofs are well within the capabilities of engineers who have been trained to use HOL.
The work done on PEM shows the feasibility of using formal logic and computer assisted reasoning tools to describe and verify relatively complex systems. The advantages of using these methods is the assurance of correctness of the speci cations given to implementers. If the speci cations are correctly implemented, then the desired security properties will be achieved.
